Social and institutional determinants of economic development are attracting increasing attention among development economists. The present paper analyses the impact of macro-level social capital and related social factors on economic development in 34 European countries. Macro-level social capital comprises different aspects of institutional quality and is closely related to income distribution and social cohesion. We used principal component analysis to group initially selected social determinants of economic development into three components (human and social capital, income equality, and redistribution), which altogether describe 64.4% of the variation in initial variables. The following regression analysis proved that all these components have a positive effect on economic development, measured by the human development index.
Introduction
The concept of economic development and its factors has changed over time. In general, economic development lies in the increase in welfare, measured as GDP per capita and its growth rate. The broader concept also includes social aspects of development -poverty reduction, better education and health, more equal income distribution. In the long run, economic development should be sustainable, which means that today's developments need not compromise the capacity of future generations to satisfy their needs. Traditionally, economic development has been seen as determined by physical and natural capital, technology, and also human capital. However, differences in the speed of economic development among countries with similar factor endowments and production technologies have called for introduction of new factors of economic development in the last decade of the 20th century. Among alternative explanations, economists have recently focused on the contribution of formal institutions and social capital to economic growth and development, thus referring to the need to take into account relational and structural aspects of economic transactions.
The aim of the current paper is to study the impact of macro-level social capital and related social factors on economic development in 34 European countries 1 , which are divided into three pre-defi ned groups according to their development levels. Social capital in general refers to the trust, civic norms and networks that enable collective action and improve market performance by reducing transaction costs. The authors focus on macro-level elements of social capital, which consist of institutional relations between people and are related to the institutional structure and functioning of society. Additional social development factors under analysis include public expenditures for human capital formation, income equality and redistribution, and social polarization.
The main reason for restricting the analysis to macro-level social capital stems from the fact that this type of social capital seems to have the highest explanatory value when explaining and comparing the economic performance of the old and new EU members and associated states from Central and Eastern Europe. Firstly, in most analyzed transition countries, microlevel social capital is very low 2 and likely hard to change in the short run, 3 meaning that its importance as a factor of economic development is also relatively low. Secondly, a complex relationship exists between micro-and macro-level social capital. Formal institutions can be substitutes for -as well as causes of -social trust and civic cooperation. Therefore, if we want to achieve better development outcomes by using social factors of development more effectively, we have to focus on these (institutional or macro-level) aspects of social capital which are easier (or at least possible) to infl uence.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The fi rst section discusses the concepts of sustainable economic development and social capital, analysing the importance of social factors in economic development on the theoretical level. The main emphasis is on the causal mechanisms of how different elements of social capital could infl uence economic performance and outcomes. Additionally, an overview of related empirical literature is given. The theoretical part of the paper is followed by an empirical analysis, the aim of which is to assess the impact of macro-level social capital and related social factors on economic development. The second section presents descriptive statistics of individual countries and group averages, also analysing the correlations between individual variables. In the third section, principal component analysis is implemented in order to generalise the wide set of social factors of development. Obtained component scores are further used to compare the relative importance of various components in different countries. In the fourth section, principal component analysis is followed by regression analysis in order to relate the attained components with different development indicators. The results of regression analysis are subsequently used for estimating the potential for social development (measured as the difference between predicted and actual value of the human development index) in the new EU Member States.
Theoretical background
Economic development is the most important goal of almost all economies -not so much as an end in itself, but rather as a means of achieving improvements in welfare. The latter include GDP per capita growth, but also broader notions of human development and sustainability. Sustainable economic development and economic growth as narrower development objectives are closely related, and without growth there would be no development. On the other hand, if economic growth is the most important goal of society, social aspects of development remain inevitably on the background. Following this line, the World Bank has currently developed the term "responsible growth", which also includes social equity and inclusion as separate development objectives (The World Bank 2004) . As such, it can be concluded that society is developing in a sustainable way when the amount of wealth generated by all forms of capital is preserved or increased.
The next subsection briefl y discusses the importance, effects, and interrelationships of social or "soft" determinants of economic growth and development -human and social capital, redistribution, and social cohesion. A general framework for this analysis appears in the following fi gure. The authors recognize that the relationships presented in Figure 1 are not complete -one can add more complicated interdependencies and additional (external) factors, such as technological progress, historical experience, and others. However, we restrict ourselves consciously in order to stay more focused on our primary research task -the social factors and outcomes of economic development.
The most well-known factor of a society's overall development (besides traditional growth determinants such as physical capital and technology) is human capital -both its quality and quantity. Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) added human capital into endogenous growth models and following empirical work have proved that human capital has a strong explanatory power in growth regressions. However, creating human capital costs a great deal. Investments in human capital through health and education expenditures will result in decreased current consumption levels. People with lower incomes are often not able to invest enough in human capital and their choices of further life path are therefore restricted. To some extent, income inequality is unavoidable, as people have different abilities when entering the life of society. It is known that, theoretically, redistribution of a society's resources is ineffi cient from the viewpoint of growth perspectives (at least in the short run). On the other hand, redistribution of a society's resources would diminish income inequality and therefore increase social cohesion, which, as discussed later, is usually benefi cial for economic development. The state should therefore implement redistribution policies in order to avoid too steep inequalities and to provide all people with access to the services needed for creating, maintaining, and improving human capital, such as education and health care.
Besides human capital, social and institutional resources are also important for ensuring the economic growth and sustainability of the development process. This issue was last raised in the 1990s in the context of the conditional convergence theory -it was acknowledged that there are various structural impediments to growth and development, such as incomplete property rights, transaction costs, ineffective government policies, income inequality, weak legal and business institutions, capital market imperfections, and cultural differences (Yeager 1999) . Most of these development obstacles represent (or result from) lack of social capital.
The relations between social capital and economic development are complicated, partly because of the vagueness and complexity of the fi rst concept. There are different approaches to defi ning, measuring and applying the concept. 4 In general, social capital includes networks together with shared norms, values, and understanding that facilitate co-operation within or among groups (OECD 2001: 41) . Social capital formation and effects may be analyzed at different levels: micro-level (interpersonal trust and informal relations between individuals), mesolevel (community of identity, interest groups) and macro-level (regional, national, international networks and institutions that infl uence people's ability to cooperate for mutual benefi t). The latter approach, which forms the basis of the current paper, relies on the work of Olson (1982) and North (1990) . More precisely, macro-level social capital refers to the quality of governmental institutions -the rule of law, contract enforcement, the absence of corruption, transparency in decision-making, an effi cient administrative system, a reliable legal system -in short, state capability and credibility (Knack 1999 , Meier 2002 . In a broader context, the effectiveness of government performance depends on social cohesion, which in turn has its roots in ethnolinquistic fractionalization of society 5 and unequal income distribution (Rupasingha 2002) .
So far, most empirical work has been done at the micro-level, showing that usually associational activity, trust and civic cooperation are associated with stronger economic performance (see, for example, Putnam 1993 , Fukuyama 1995 , Helliwell and Putnam 1995 , Knack and Keefer 1997a , Hjerppe 2000 , Zak and Knack 1998 , Beugelsdijk and Schaik 2005 . The theoretical reasoning behind these empirical outcomes states that social capital facilitates economic exchange by reducing transaction costs and risk -as a result, fewer resources need to be wasted for formal contracts and monitoring. Besides these micro-economic impact channels, civil social capital can also infl uence economic performance through macro-political channels. Empirical evidence shows that micro-level social capital can strengthen democratic governance (Almond and Verba 1963) , increase the effi ciency and honesty of public admin-istration (Putnam 1993 , Knack 2002 , and improve the quality of economic policies (Easterly and Levine 1997) . Empirical evidence also reveals direct economic effects of macro-level social capital. Most earlier cross-country studies approximated governmental social capital by Gastil's civil liberties indices (Gastil 1990) , showing that civil liberties are positively associated with per capita income growth (Kormendi and Meguire 1985 , Grier and Tullock 1989 , Scully 1988 . Concerning causality issues, it has been shown that civil liberties infl uence economic growth only if variables of investment rates and educational attainment are taken into account (Helliwell 1994 , Barro 1996 -implying that any benefi cial impact of democracy on growth may operate through these factor accumulation channels. Recently, Gastil indices have been supplemented or replaced by several other indicators of the institutional environment. 6 For instance, the World Bank introduced the credibility index as a measure of social capital positively related to a higher level of economic growth and investment (World Bank 1997 ). An empirical study by Rodrik (1997) showed that an index of institutional quality well explains the ranking among East Asian countries by their growth performance. Several studies have found that subjective political risk ratings have a strong explanatory power for growth and private investment (Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995) . measured quality of governance by six composite indicators and found that this correlates strongly and positively with per capita incomes across countries. Many authors also acknowledged and tested (with varied results) the potential for reverse causality from economic performance to institutional quality (Knack and Keefer 1995 , Chong and Calderon 1997 , Mauro 1995 . Summing up, all of these studies point to a signifi cant and positive relationship between good governance and growth, with strong indications that the former causes the latter.
Further, several studies have focused on ethnic divisions and inequality as sources of slower growth through their impact on trust, social cohesion, and economic policymaking. Most of these studies posit macro-political channels by which polarization worsens economic performance. For example, Alesina and Perotti (1996) have found that income inequality as an instrument for political instability lowers investment rates and therefore also economic growth. The work of Rodrik (1998) and Easterly (1999) has shown that economic growth in general, and the ability to manage shocks in particular, is the twin product of coherent public institutions and societies' ability to generate the so-called "middle-class consensus"; the latter defi ned as a higher share of income for the middle class and a low degree of ethnic polarization. Knack (1999) has found a positive correlation between income equality and trust at the cross-country level. He has also indicated that inequality has strong direct effects on government performance (Knack 2002 ) and economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997b) . On the other hand, the formation of social capital itself is related to distribution of wealth. If income distribution is unfairly unequal, some people will be marginalized and driven away from a society's life, which results in decreasing social cohesion. Ritzen, Easterly, and Woolcook (2000) have also argued that key development outcomes are more likely to be associated with countries that are both socially cohesive and governed by effective public institutions. Social cohesion is essential for generating the trust needed to implement reforms -citizens have to
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trust that the short-term losses that inevitably arise from reform will be more than offset by long-term gains.
Besides income inequality, low social cohesion may also result from a society's polarization along ethnic, racial, or linguistic lines. Several authors have found signifi cant correlations between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and socio-economic indices such as long-run growth and quality of governance (Alesina et al. 2002 (Alesina et al. , 2004 Easterly and Levine 1997; Mauro 1995; Collier 2000) . Economic motivations underlying the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic performance are discussed in detail by Alesina and Ferrara (2004) , and Easterly and Levine (1997). Most importantly, ethnic divisions increase polarization of preferences for public goods, impeding agreement over their provision and encouraging rent-seeking activities. However, there is no clear answer to the question whether (and how) the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization on growth depend on the level of income or other features of a society. Alesina and Ferrara (2004) have suggested that under reasonable technological conditions, fractionalization may have a positive (or less negative) effect on output at the higher level of development. Collier (1998 Collier ( , 2000 has shown that ethnic heterogeneity impedes growth signifi cantly more sharply in nations with fewer political freedoms, indicating that democracies manage to cope better with ethnic diversity. Finally, there is some evidence that polarization together with formal institutions infl uence growth rates in part through their impact on trust. For example, Zak and Knack (1998) have demonstrated that income and land inequality, discrimination, and corruption are associated with signifi cantly lower growth rates, but the connection of these variables to growth weakens when trust is taken into account.
Data and comparisons
In the current study, analysis of effects of social factors on economic development is based on macroeconomic panel data of European Union Member States and transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The majority of the data are taken from or based on the WDI and HDI databases (WDI 2002 , HDI 2002 ) and refer to the year 2001. Where no information is available for year 2001, the latest available data are used. Indicators of quality of governance and civic engagement originate from the database of , and the measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation from Alesina et al. (2002) .
Altogether the initial analysis covered 34 European countries, 7 which were divided into three groups on the basis of their development level, as indicated by HDI value. This division attempts to identify possible differences in the relationship between development outcomes and their social and institutional inputs, which might be determined by the initial development level of a country. The countries in Group 1 are the founders of the EU and the Member States in Scandinavia (11 countries, HDI rank 3-18). Group 2 includes all post-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004, and also Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Croatia (13 countries, HDI rank 19-50). Group 3 consists of other transition economies (10 countries, HDI rank 53-108).
Despite clear logic behind the formation of the country groups, it appears that differences in development levels of countries belonging to different groups were often marginal (see Figure 2). Germany, for example, belongs in Group 1 and Spain in Group 2, although their HDI ranks differ only by one position and HDI values by 0.003 units.
In order to verify whether these pre-defi ned groups differ on the basis of tendencies in the larger set of individual variables, a discriminant analysis was performed. Two discriminant functions (see Appendix 1) generalized a wider set of social capital, income distribution, and taxation indicators. The results of this analysis were as follows. Firstly, all countries appeared to belong to their pre-defi ned groups, although in some cases (e.g. Spain, France) there was a fairly high probability (ca 30%) of appearing in a higher or lower group. Secondly, the dispersion of individual objects around mean values of groups was relatively high. Thirdly, we observed the regularity that the grouping of objects on the basis of social capital indicators is relatively consistent with theoretical assumptions. Fourthly, it appeared that the tax system in Group 2 is different from that of Groups 1 and 3, whereas the tax systems in the country groups of the lowest and highest development levels are quite similar. This could be interpreted as the relative success of more radical tax reforms in the new EU members, compared to the other transition countries in Europe.
Next, initial comparative analysis of main development indicators and their determinants is presented. Tables 1-4 illustrate the mean values and standard deviations of different indicators by country groups, as compared to the average of the whole sample. Table 1 presents the mean values of economic development indicators, used as dependent variables in further empirical analysis. In the current study, traditional measures of economic development include GDP per capita in US dollars (adjusted for purchasing power parity) and the human development index, while sustainability is approximated by adjusted net savings 8 . It can be observed that indices of economic development tend to change synchronically, and the country groups differ notably from each other. However, this is not surprising as the country groups were formed on the basis of the general welfare indicator (HDI rank). Table 2 presents the average values of economic growth and indicators of human capital formation -the latter belonging arguably among the most important social factors of development. Economic growth is measured by GDP per capita annual growth rate 1990-2001. Human capital formation is described as health expenditure per capita and public education expenditure per capita (both adjusted for purchasing power parity). As can be observed in Table 2 , in 1990s growth rates in the less developed European countries were not signifi cantly higher than in the highly developed ones. Quite to the contrary -countries in Group 3 had not reached the development level of 1990 even eleven years later. Short-run growth rates in year 2001 were consistent with the theoretical presumption that poorer countries have a faster growth rate than rich countries. Corresponding average growth rates were 101.6% in Group 1, 103.6% in Group 2, and 105.6% in Group 3. Still, in some countries from Group 3 the growth rate was negative. It can therefore be concluded that although countries with different development levels tend to converge, this process is not fast enough to guarantee conforming development levels in the short term.
Slow convergence is partly related to the fact that poorer countries have not enough means to invest in human capital. Table 2 shows that health expenditures in Group 2 are less than half of those in Group 1, and in Group 3 almost ten times less than in Group 1. Differences in public education expenditures are also signifi cant, although not so drastic. However, it should be noted that the picture might change when private education expenditures are consideredpeople in richer countries have broader possibilities to acquire an education for payment.
Concerning other social and institutional factors of economic development (besides human capital and its formation), there is no common agreement about which indicators are most relevant to include in analysis. Instead, a high variety of different -and therefore often noncomparable -indicators has been used in previous studies (see the overview in section 2). In the current study, the authors use their own original approach, relying on the concept of social 9 These variables are arguably more comprehensive than simplistic civil freedom and political risk indices used in most previous studies, described in section 2. For methodological details and updated indicators, see World Bank (2005) [http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/]. 10 The impact of ethnic diversity on social and economic outcomes often turns out to be nonlinear: polarisation can be at a maximum when there is a small number of groups of roughly equal size (Horowitz 1985) , while in case of many small groups no one will normally have an incentive or opportunity to impose its will on all others (Knack 1999) . Despite this, it has been argued that fractionalisation indices like ELFRAC work better as a determinant of economic outcomes, compared to other alternatives (for details, see Alesina and Ferrara 2004) .
capital. We concentrate on macro-level aspects of social capital, which are approximated by quality of governance, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, income distribution and redistribution. Quality of governance is measured by the six variables defi ned and calculated by , including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption control. 9 Since the initial values of these variables are given as deviations from the mean value of the sample, they have simply been summarised as a single measure of quality of governance. A higher value of the quality of governance index means a better situation in this respect. Table 3 shows a clear positive relationship between a country's development level and the quality of governance. However, there is no clear understanding about the causality and direction of this relationship. Summarizing the results of previous empirical studies (see section 2), the causality most likely runs in both directions -on the one hand, it could be expected that higher quality of governance leads to better development outcomes, but on the other hand, a higher development level may be needed in order to improve the performance of formal state institutions. The former argument is further tested in empirical analysis in sections 4 and 5. Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELFRAC) includes ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of a society. First, the sub-indices for each type of fractionalisation were calculated as Herfi ndahl's indices (Alesina et al. 2002) :
where s i is the share of group i over the total of the population. These indices measure the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a unit of observation (a country) belong to two different groups. For greater comprehensiveness, fractionalisation indices in Table 3 are calculated as geometric means of the three sub-indices. A higher value refers to higher ethnolinguistic fractionalisation and therefore to a lower level of social capital. 10 This result is consistent with the previous statement that highly developed countries have more social capital than less developed ones. Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation is the lowest in Portugal, which means that Portugal is the most uniform country in terms of ethnic, linguistic, or relii gious differences. Latvia's ethno-linguistic fractionalisation is among the highest, referring to the fact that there are two groups of people (Latvians and Russians), different in ethnic, linguistic, and religious aspects.
In order to analyse income inequality, the Gini index was used fi rst. Unfortunately, it was not possible to fi nd the Gini indices for all of the countries in the same reference year. For the highly developed countries, for example, these indices are available only for the middle of the 1990s. On the other hand, it is known that income distribution in developed countries has been relatively stable across the years. The redistribution of income can be assessed by the size of government, which is approximated here by general government fi nal consumption expenditure (see Table 4 ). As seen in Table 4 , a higher development level correlates both with equality in income distribution and a higher share of public consumption. It is therefore not proven that more equal income distribution and a higher share of public consumption hinder economic growth and development.
In order to demonstrate the tendencies described in Tables 1-4 more clearly and to prepare further analysis, a correlation analysis was performed for individual variables. The correlation coeffi cients and their signifi cances appear in Appendix 2. In general, it can be concluded that the relations between individual variables are consistent with the theoretical hypothesis. Concerning the relations between the selected development indicators, it appears that GDP per capita and HDI values strongly correlate with each other (which is predictable as GDP per capita is part of the HDI index) and also with other social development variables. The third development indicator, adjusted net savings, correlates signifi cantly and positively with GDP per capita, but not with the HDI. Clearly, this measure of sustainability describes different aspects of economic development and therefore complements traditional development indicators. Additionally, sustainable savings are signifi cantly and negatively related to the Gini index. This result contradicts the theoretical assumption that higher income inequality encourages savings and investments. Surprisingly, the Gini index does not correlate significantly with any other development indicator.
Another interesting result is that general government fi nal consumption expenditure is more strongly related to the human development level (HDI) than wealth (GDP per capita), confi rming the importance of public consumption with respect to actual development level. Additionally, general government fi nal consumption expenditure correlates signifi cantly and positively with health and education expenditures and total tax revenue, but not with the other indicators of a tax system. Ambiguous correlation results assert that it is not reasonable to look for relations between a tax system and tax revenue, public expenditures, or development indicators, as tax systems in different countries are not similar.
Further, all six individual indicators of the quality of governance are positively connected to GDP per capita and HDI values. However, the relations with general government fi nal consumption expenditure appear to be weak or insignifi cant, although a reliable correlation exists between government expenditure and the generalised measure of quality of governance. Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation correlates statistically signifi cantly with all other factors of development except general government fi nal consumption, adjusted net savings and the Gini index.
Results of principal component analysis
In order to analyse and generalise the set of individual social and institutional development indicators, a component analysis was implemented. For better coverage of macro-level social capital indicators and their possible impact channels, the initial set of independent variables (presented in Tables 2-4) was extended to include (a) alternative inequality measures, (b) separate components of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, and (c) more detailed information about government expenditures and taxes. The extended list of variables appears in Table 5 . While using the method of principal components, three main components were distinguished which altogether explained 64.4% of total variation of the individual variables. The component matrix was rotated based on the varimax method with Kaiser normalisation and the results appear in Table 5 .
The fi rst component describes 32.5% of total variation of the individual variables and is closely related to human capital formation and basic macro-level social capital measures. In further analysis this component is shortly referred to as "human and social capital". The content of the second component is mixed -it includes variables of income distribution, but also the shares of women in government and education expenditures. This result indicates that higher expenditures on education and women's participation in decision-making might lead to more equal income distribution. Altogether, the second component describes 19.9% of total variation and can be labelled as "income equality". The third component describes 12.0% of total variation of the individual variables, but its nature is diffi cult to explain. As the variables in this component are mostly related to taxation, the authors labelled it redistribution. Somewhat surprisingly, the third component also includes an indicator of a society's religious diversifi cation. Anyway, this result should not be accidental, as the majority of the population should support a tax (or any other) system in a democratic society.
Values of the component scores for each country appear in Appendix 3 and Figures 5-7 , and the average values of country groups are shown in Figure 4 . Component score 0.0 means that the object is at the average level of the sample. Numbers indicate the positive or negative difference between the actual and the average value, measured by standard deviation.
As the component scores are expected to play an important role in economic development, it is possible to interpret them as general indicators of development. From Figure 4 we can see that all component scores are positive (above average) in the highly developed countries and negative (below average) in the other country groups. Component scores of F 1 differ remarkably across the country groups, being close to the average in Group 2 and deviating strongly in a negative direction in the less developed European countries. As assumed on a theoretical basis, no clear relation exists between the second component of income equality and the level of economic development. Deviations between scores are relatively small and suggest that the worst situation exists in the countries of Group 2. The analysis also proves the hypothesis that income distribution tends to become more unequal as development speeds up. At the same time we can observe that when the development process moves on, the income distribution should equalise again. Figures 5-7 present component scores of each country by pre-defi ned country groups. Countries are arranged by the added total of component scores (see the values in the last column of the table in Appendix 3), starting with the highest. Looking for general regularities inside the country groups, we can fi rst see that Group 3 is the most homogeneous, while signifi cant intra-group differences exist both in Group 2 and (especially) in Group 1, concerning income equality and redistribution policies. In Group 3, the component scores of human and social capital are clearly lower than the scores of income equality and redistribution, the latter being almost equal to each other in all countries (see Figure 5 ). In Group 2, older EU Member States such as Italy, Portugal, and Greece become expectedly distinct with their higher scores of human and social capital (see Figure 6 ). However, looking at the factor scores of income equality and redistribution, there is no apparent pattern or logic.
We can see that in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Estonia, the scores of equality are remarkably lower than those of redistribution. In Greece, the low level of equality is combined with an even lower level of redistribution. In other countries the levels and differences between F 2 and F 3 are less signifi cant.
When comparing the Baltic countries with each other, it appears that Latvia has the highest and Lithuania the lowest sum of the three factor scores (see also last columns in Appendix 3). Although human and social capital are less developed in Latvia, this is compensated by higher income equality and success in redistribution. In Lithuania, relatively high income equality is combined with insuffi cient human and social capital development and redistribution. In contrast, Estonia has the most unequal income distribution among the Baltic countries, but the highest level of human and social capital and a modest result in redistribution. In Scandinavian countries, the scores for income equality are high and the scores for redistribution relatively low. This confi rms the logic that income distribution should equalise when the country reaches higher development levels. If this does not happen, other ways should be found to compensate for the negative impact of inequality on economic development. One possibility is to develop human and social capital through other (institutional) channels, as has been done in Ireland and the United Kingdom. Another choice is to redistribute wealth for social purposes, as in the case of Germany, the Netherlands, and France. In these countries, the component scores for redistribution are remarkably higher than for income equality.
The effect of derived component scores on welfare indicators
The previous analysis in section three demonstrates that there is no apparent pattern in which social components have the strongest impact on economic development. Comparing the country rankings based on the HDI and the sum of all three component scores (see columns 3 and 11 in Appendix Table 3 ), we can see that low scores of equality and/or redistribution often result in a lower cumulative ranking position, and vice versa. Ireland is an extreme case, falling from position 4-7 by the HDI to 21st place by the sum of component scores. Slovakia and Hungary represent the opposite case -their HDI rankings are 18 and 19, respectively, but the higher scores of equality and redistribution move them up 9 and 6 positions.
In order to control statistically the impact of the general set of indicators on development indicators, a regression analysis was run with component scores as exogenous variables (F 1 -human and social capital, F 2 -income equality, F 3 -redistribution). GDP per capita (USD, PPP), HDI value and adjusted net savings were used as endogenous variables of economic development. The regression results appear in Table 6 . Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * --signifi cant at a level of 0.1, ** -signifi cant at a level of 0.05, *** -signifi cant at a level of 0.01. Unfortunately, it was not possible to explain the formation of adjusted net savings via a reliable regression model. This may be due to the small set of data, or because formed social development factors have only a minor effect on adjusted net savings, as long as the latter term does not include depreciation of social capital. However, earlier work by Nettan (2005) with a similar dataset (although using a longer time span) has shown that the rate of adjusted net savings depends on macro-level social capital (approximated by political stability) both in the old and new Member States of the EU, whereas the impact is stronger in the case of new members. Additionally, the aggregated quality of governance was found to have a statistically signifi cant impact on adjusted net savings in the old Member States of the EU (ibid).
Comparing the signifi cance of component scores in different regression models, it appears that the fi rst component is signifi cant both in the formation of GDP per capita and HDI values, but insignifi cant concerning adjusted net savings formation. These results (except the last one) are consistent with the theoretical assumptions. The second component has a statistically signifi cant effect only on adjusted net savings, but as noted, this model as a whole was statistically insignifi cant. However, this result could imply that the issue of income distribution is important for sustainability of development -although positive coeffi cients indicate that higher inequality leads to a higher sustainable savings rate. On the other hand, this is consistent with the theoretical assumption that the concentration of income in the hands of small elite groups increases savings (therefore also sustainable savings) and investments.
The third component has a statistically signifi cant effect only on the human development index. As human development is the main focus of our analysis, the formation of the human development index is discussed here in more detail. Regression analysis gave the following model with the HDI as a dependent welfare indicator (see also where HDI 100 = HDIx100 and F 1 … F 3 are component scores. The model describes 86.1% of the variation in the dependent variable. As the mean values of all independent variables are equal, it can be concluded that the fi rst principal component called "human and social capital" has the highest infl uence on HDI value. The impact of the second component "income equality" is almost ten times lower and its signifi cance is also the lowest. This can be explained by the fact that the formation of income distribution is deeply related to historical developments and the political system of a society. Ireland and United Kingdom, for example, both have liberal regimes according to the typology of Esping-Andresen (1990) . Income distribution in these countries has been constantly more unequal than in continental Europe, but their HDI ranks (respectively 4th and 5th position in the current sample) refer to high development le vels. In the group of new EU Member States, Estonia has the most unequal income distribution (the value of the Gini index is 37.6). Similarly to Ireland and the United Kingdom, Estonia has followed liberal economic policies during the transition process, the result of which has been an increase in wealth, but also deepening income inequality. In the light of this information it is not surprising that the component scores of income equality in these countries are similar to each other and remain below the average of the sample as a whole (see Appendix 3).
As the substance of the third component (redistribution) remains somewhat vague, it is difficult to explain its component scores. However, it is not reasonable to remove this component from the analysis, as the extreme values of F 2 and F 3 appear often in the same countries. Denmark and Finland, for example, have the highest component scores in income equality, but the lowest scores in redistribution. In Germany the situation is the opposite -income equality scores are largely negative, but redistribution scores are the highest. This indicates that there could be some complementarities or trade-offs between income equality and redistribution, which were discussed at the end of section 3.
Finally, the authors analysed the development perspectives of the new EU Member States on the basis of changes in the HDI, which could take place if there are favourable developments in component scores. Table 7 shows the values of the HDI predicted by regression model (2) and their deviations from the actual values. 
Conclusions
The concept of economic development and its factors has changed over time. As understood today, economic growth is no longer the only development objective -members of society must also be guaranteed basic values such as freedom, equality, and security for a higher level of welfare. These values are often contradictory in their substance and cannot be maximized simultaneously. In the long run, economic development should be sustainable, which means that today's developments should not compromise the capacity of future generations to satisfy their needs. This concept also involves social aspects of development. As economic activities are largely linked to different kinds of networks, economists have recently focused on the contribution of social capital to economic growth and development. At the microeco-nomic level, this is seen primarily through the ways social capital improves the functioning of markets. At the macroeconomic level, institutions, legal frameworks, and the government's role in the organization of production are seen as affecting macroeconomic performance. Another important aspect of macro-level social capital is related to income distribution and social cohesion.
This paper presents an analysis that aims to study the impact of social factors on economic development in 34 European countries. Unfortunately, some countries were excluded from the fi nal analysis due to gaps in the data. The principal component analysis enabled us to group 18 selected independent variables into three components, which altogether describe 64.4% of the variation of the initial variables. The components are named as follows (in order of size of the variation described) -human and social capital, income equality, and redistribution.
As a result of regression analysis, it turned out that all the components have a positive effect on economic development indicators. As it was not possible to explain the formation of adjusted net savings via a reliable regression model, we subsequently focused on human development index formation. The regression model with all of the components as independent variables describes 86.1% of the variation in HDI value. It appears that the impact of human and social capital is about fi ve times stronger than the impact of redistribution, and almost ten times stronger than the impact of income equality. Additionally, the statistical signifi cance of the relationship between income equality and HDI value is relatively low, but gives no reason to deny that infl uence altogether. Despite this we can conclude that most of the factors introduced in earlier research appear to play an important role in the sustainable economic development of a country.
In general, our results are consistent with previous empirical work, suggesting that a significant and positive relationship exists between macro-level social capital (measured by different indicators) and economic development. However, it is diffi cult to draw more precise parallels with earlier research, as different authors use different statistical methods and data sources. In most studies, the dependent development variable is GDP per capita growth or share of investments in GDP, and the independent variables of macro-level social capital are not aggregated (at least not in a component analysis). As such, our focus on human development and sustainability is rather exceptional. Our approach also differs from others by incorporating possible impact channels (such as different fi scal policy instruments) of macro-level social capital into the analysis. On the other hand, it has been argued that using different indicators of macro-level social capital does not make the results of different studies irrelevant (Knack 1999) . While any single measure of government social capital is imperfect, the shortcomings of each of the various measures are largely independent of each other. Therefore, these empirical fi ndings must be considered very seriously. In the political sphere, this implies that if the goal is something more than simply a higher economic growth rate, policies leading to higher productivity should be complemented by efforts to improve the quality of governance and to maintain the social cohesion of society. Besides direct positive effects on a country's credibility (in the eyes of foreign investors, for example) and individual-level life satisfaction, shortcomings in these aspects could also hinder long-run growth prospects.
Concerning implications for further research, the authors are planning to develop this research by incorporating more up-to-date data on economic development outcomes. Although the data of macro-level social capital are gapped and not available for each year, it is further possible to analyse time lags in relation to social development factors and outcomes. Theory also suggests that payoffs due to improvements in institutional quality and social cohesion (or macro-level social capital) will not appear in the same period but later. More complete conclusions could be drawn when longer time series become available. For example, comparison of the performance of the countries in Groups 2 and 3 enables an evaluation of how (if at all) EU membership helps to achieve social development goals. Notes: ** Correlation is signifi cant at a level of 0.01 (two-tailed); * Correlation is signifi cant at a level of 0.05 (two-tailed)
Appendix 1. Structure matrixes of discriminant functions

